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The European Commission (1990) and Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) pointed out that the
traditional paradigm of Optimum Currency Areas is misleading because some consequences
of monetary unions bring country-specific shocks closer together. Trade, for example, is not
only a result of monetary union but it also increases business cycles synchronization. We test
for the 53 African countries over the 1975-2004 period the hypothesis suggesting that
monetary integration adds force to bilateral trade intensity which in turn, improves conditions
for the practice of common monetary policy throughout business cycles synchronization. Our
results support such argument and suggest some policy recommendations for African
monetary integration.
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It is now well-established that monetary union - hereafter MU - stimulates bilateral trade,
increases the credibility of the monetary policies and ensures price stability (see Frankel and
Rose 2002). Bilateral trade, policy credibility and price stability rise investment, deepen ﬁ-
nancial development and thus make economic growth more substantial. We keep the conven-
tional deﬁnition of monetary unions which are groups of countries sharing common currency,
common monetary policy and, likely, geographical borders. They also have common central
bank According to Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) theory initiated by Mundell (1961), a
monetary union - hereafter MU - is suitable if asymmetric shocks remain low and if trade
ﬂows are large. When asymmetric output shocks occur within a MU, common monetary
policy cannot be tailored in response to a single country’s shock. Hence, it is less costly for
a set of economies to form a MU if their business cycles are synchronized using historical
data (see Mundell 1961). Moreover when trade ﬂows are important, transaction costs’ sav-
ings could be substantial and consequences on output growth important (see Frankel and
Rose 2002).
The European Commission (1990) and Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) have introduced
an alternative view about the endogeneity of OCA criteria. They pointed out that the
traditional analysis is misleading because some consequences of MUs bring country-speciﬁc
shocks closer together. Trade, for example, is not only a result of MU but it also reinforces
integration process. Bilateral trade and shocks synchronization are tightly linked and are
both positively aﬀected by MU. Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) suggest, then, that MUs
could be self-validating via bilateral trade. They show that bilateral trade fosters GDP busi-
ness cycles co-movement for OECD countries 1. Thus, more trade increases business cycles
synchronization (hereafter BCS) i.e. reduces asymmetric GDP shocks and facilitates the
practice of common monetary policy i.e. monetary integration. The endogeneity hypothesis
was further extended to others OCA criteria such as labor mobility, ﬁnancial integration
and regional risk-sharing mechanisms and conﬁrmed on European data (e.g. Babetskii 2005,
Fidrmuc 2005 and Inklaar et al. 2005). MUs are self-fulﬁlling policy regime through bilat-
eral trade 2. On the one hand, sharing a common monetary policy and a common currency
stimulates bilateral trade which in turn increases BCS. On the other, a great BCS improves
conditions for the practice of common monetary policy. Historical data do not provide a
full picture of asymmetric GDP shocks within a MU as long as the integration process goes
ahead.
In Africa, traditional requirements for monetary integration - mainly a high degree of
trade integration between prospective members and a high correlation of shocks across coun-
tries - are not particularly strong. Trade ﬂows within African countries are small, output
shocks are uncorrelated and regional risk-sharing is missing. Then, the endogeneity thesis
could be relevant for African macroeconomic integration. The multiplicity of currencies and
small sizes of economies make the beneﬁts of monetary integration such as trade, ﬁscal per-
formance and output growth, potentially large via currency’s convertibility and exchange
1 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
2 An alternative view is also defensible on theoretical grounds. Krugman (1991, 1993) and Eichengreen
(1992) put forward that trade could lead to countries’ specialization and therefore, could increase the mag-
nitude of asymmetric GDP shocks (see section 2).
1rate stability. Over ﬁfty-three African countries, thirty-nine issue their own currency. The
other ﬁfteen countries belong to the CFA zone. Except Comoros, CFA’s states members form
two MUs: the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) and the CAEMC
(Central African Economic and Monetary Community). WAEMU and CAEMC are unusual
MUs since members’ states already shared common currencies before the adoption of eco-
nomic union. A range of academic papers ﬁnd that OCA criteria are not fulﬁlled within
WAEMU and CAEMC (see Fielding and Shields 2001, Fielding et al. 2004, Fielding and
Shields 2005a and 2005b and Yehoue 2005a). Fielding and Shields (2001) analyze output
and inﬂation correlation within CFA’s members over the 1963-1997 period. They obtain
that inﬂationary shocks are highly correlated while GDP shocks lowly co-moved. Fielding
et al. (2004) show that asymmetric GDP shocks are more important within CAEMC than
WAEMU. Fielding et Shields (2005a et 2005b) ﬁnd that CFA membership does not make a
diﬀerence in terms of BCS compared to some African countries. Finally, Yehoue (2005) puts
forward the lack of regional risk-sharing within CAEMC and WAEMU over the 1980-2000
period. This is straightforward since WAEMU and CAEMC were created more by historical
and political impulse than by economical will. Until January 1994, WAEMU and CAEMC
worked without economic unions. Then, the right issue for these MUs must be the existence
of self-validating factors such as bilateral trade as supported by the endogeneity thesis. This
paper estimates the impact of bilateral trade intensity on BCS for African countries from
1975 to 2004. We ﬁnd that African bilateral trade intensity enhances African BCS and em-
powers African monetary integration. However, this impact is attenuated by the low level
of BCS. The adoption of a MU by African countries who do not actually share monetary
policy would lead to a gain of BCS ranging between 18.6% and 58.8%.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying
theory and a brief formalization of the relationship between bilateral trade and BCS. In
section 3, we describe the calculations of bilateral trade intensities and BCS. Section 4
develops the econometric strategy and the ﬁfth section presents results and some robustness
checks. The last section concludes and provides some critical remarks.
2 The literature debate: divergence or convergence?
The impact of bilateral trade on BCS could be either negative (divergence argument) or
positive (convergence argument) whether most of trade is inter-industry or intra-industry.
On the one side, Krugman (1991, 1993) and Eichengreen (1992) argue that more bilateral
trade may lead to more specialization of countries according to the theory of comparative
advantages. This specialization desynchronizes output business cycles via diﬀerent industry-
speciﬁc supply-shocks. One the other side, some theoretical reasons advocate that more
bilateral trade leads to more BCS. First, according to the Keynesian multiplier, business
cycles of one country can be transmitted to its trading partner even if countries are diﬀerently
specialized. For example, if one country experiences a positive supply-shock, it addresses
an additional demand to its partner who in turn, increases its supply. Second, Frankel and
Rose (1998) argue that industry-speciﬁc shocks become more similar and business cycles more
correlated when most of trade is intra-industry. They ﬁnd, on a sample of 21 industrialized
countries over 34 years that bilateral trade intensity aﬀects positively BCS. Fidrmuc (2005)
2corroborates and explains Frankel and Rose’s (1998) ﬁndings by the importance of intra-
industry trade.
When most of trade is intra-industry, aggregate demand shocks (which are common for
all sectors) are predominant and drive industry-speciﬁc shocks (which are similar across
countries). Then intra-industry trade leads to similar supply-shocks across trading partners
and to more BCS. Business cycles become more desynchronized when countries experience
diﬀerent industry-speciﬁc shocks which are more signiﬁcant when most of trade is inter-
industry. Conversely, most intra-industry trade drives aggregate demand shocks and makes
industry-speciﬁc shocks more analogous and business cycles more similar.
Frankel and Rose’s (1998) arguments look relevant for African countries. African man-
ufacturing industries are underdeveloped and Africa exports mainly raw material towards
industrialized countries. Subsequently, African bilateral exports are a little processed. For
that reason, we can suppose that most of African bilateral trade is intra-industry (which is
favorable to BCS) rather than inter-industry (which is against BCS). It seems then logical in
an African monetary integration perspective to look for a positive impact of bilateral trade
intensity on BCS.
The relationship of bilateral trade on BCS is not clear-cut in economic literature. Whether
bilateral trade is mostly intra-industry or inter-industry, the impact is positive or negative.
In order to estimate the impact of African bilateral trade on BCS, we built the following
equation linking BCS to bilateral trade:
Corri,j,τ = φ + κ · TIi,j,τ + ǫi,j,τ (1)
Where Corri,j,τ is the correlation coeﬃcient of countries’ i and j GDP business cycles over
the period τ. TIi,j,τ measures the average of bilateral trade indicator over the period τ and
ǫi,j,τ denotes numerous others factors which aﬀect BCS above and beyond the inﬂuences of
bilateral trade. φ and κ are the regression coeﬃcients to be estimated 3. We are interested
in both the sign and the size of coeﬃcient κ. The sign indicates whether the Krugman
(1991, 1993) and Eichengreen (1992) specialization eﬀect dominates (κ < 0) putting forward
that more bilateral trade would lead to more idiosyncratic business cycles and hence to lower
correlation of economic activity or the Frankel and Rose’s (1997, 1998) eﬀect prevails (κ > 0)
suggesting that more bilateral trade would lead to industry-speciﬁc shocks that are common
across countries. The size quantiﬁes the economic importance of this eﬀect. We now turn
to empirical investigation in the next section.
3 Calculations of bilateral trade intensity and business
cycles synchronization
To estimate the impact of African bilateral trade intensity on BCS, we build a panel dataset
of 1378 pairs (at most) of the 53 African countries over 3 decades (1975-1984, 1985-1994 and
1995-2004).
3 The estimation of equation (1) is motivated by the lack of data availability of African data on sectoral
trade.
33.1 Bilateral trade intensity
We use the International Monetary Fund’s bilateral trade database (Direction of Trade 2005)
to calculate bilateral trade intensity. We compute two indicators of bilateral trade inten-
sity. The ﬁrst catches the magnitude of bilateral trade relative to total trade of the pair of
countries. We normalize bilateral trade by total trade (denoted TI1):
TI1 =
Xi,j,t + Mi,j,t
Xi,t + Xj,t + Mi,t + Mj,t
(2)






Where Xi,j,t stands for bilateral exports FOB and Mi,j,t for bilateral imports CIF of country i
toward country j at the time t. Xi,t (Mi,t) refers to total exports FOB (total imports CIF) of
country i and Yi,t represents real GDP of country i 4. We compute decade-average bilateral
trade intensities for each pair of countries 5. Descriptive statistics on African bilateral trade
intensities are reported in table 1. The averages of TI1 and TI2 are quite low and signiﬁcantly
correlated: bilateral trade accounts for 0.09% of total trade (TI1) and for 0.03% of GDPs
(TI2). Their correlation coeﬃcient equals to 0.9001 and is signiﬁcant at 1%.
3.2 Business cycles synchronization
We compute countries’ GDPs business cycles with the Baxter and King’s (1999) linear band-
pass ﬁlter. We focus on this ﬁlter since it was built speciﬁcally for business cycles co-
movement analysis as implied by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) 6 We suppose a common
duration for countries’ GDPs business cycles going from 8 to 32 quarters i.e. 2 to 8 years as
suggested by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and Calderón et al. (2002). Originally Baxter
and King (1999) advise a duration from 6 to 32 quarters which means 1.5 to 8 year 7. For
each country, we calculate the cyclical component of the logarithm of the real GDP over the
1975-2004 period. Then by pair, we catch BCS by a simple correlation coeﬃcient over a
4 FOB for free on board and CIF for cost-insurance-freight.
5 Bilateral trade intensities indicators used in this paper are those introduced by Frankel and Rose (1997,
1998) and by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005). Bilateral trade could be normalized by the minimum or the
maximum of countries’ trade or output because bilateral trade is more or less important whether country
is small or not. This is not a concern for our approach since we are looking for the trade impact on BCS
independently of countries sizes.
6 Some authors as Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), Rose and Engel (2002) and Darvas et al. (2005) use
alternative ﬁlters such as ﬁrst diﬀerence or Hodrick and Prescott’s (1997). In this paper, we rule out the
ﬁrst diﬀerence ﬁlter because it does not take into account the duration and the range of business cycles. The
Hodrick and Prescott’s (1997) ﬁlter is used as robustness check in the section 5.2. Thus, we only describe
BCS compute with the Baxter and King’s (1999) linear ﬁlter.
7 Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) justify the duration from 2 to 8 years by their sample heterogeneity.
However Rand and Tarp (2002) estimate the duration of 6 African countries over the 1980-1999 period and
ﬁnd about 3 years for South Africa (2.95) and Malawi (3), 2 years for Zimbabwe (2.6), Côte d’Ivoire (2.43)
and Nigeria (2.38) and ﬁnally less than 2 years for Morocco (1.93).
4decade. We denote this BCS indicator Corr. BP. Descriptive statistics on African BCS are
reported in table 1. On average, the correlation coeﬃcient is about 0.0422 8.
4 Econometric methodology
We use three diﬀerent techniques to estimate equation (1) linking bilateral trade intensity
to BCS: the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and the
countries-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect (FE). We include in all regressions an intercept and dummies
decades for 1985-1994, 1995-2004 in order to catch a possible common temporal change
across pairs of countries. We also correct estimations for the heteroskedasticity using clus-
tering method because pairs of countries’ observations may not be independent throughout
decades 9. Then standard errors reported are clustered by pairs of countries 10. We ﬁrst
estimate the impact of bilateral trade intensity on BCS using simple OLS. However, the OLS
technique maybe inappropriate to identify the impact of bilateral trade intensity on BCS
since countries with business cycles highly connected are likely to trade more (or less) during
common expansions (or recessions). Furthermore BCS and bilateral trade intensity are pos-
itively associated to the adoption of MU. For these reasons, we apply the Two-Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) technique to estimate equation (1). Following Frankel and Rose (1998), we
use basic variables from the gravity model as instrumental variables of bilateral trade inten-
sities: the logarithm of distance between the pair of countries, a dummy variable for common
border and a dummy variable for common language). Since we are using more instrumental
variables than endogenous variables we check that instruments collectively capture the inde-
pendent variation in the right-hand-side variables. We ﬁrst perform an F-test to make sure
that excluded instruments are relevant to bilateral trade intensities at the ﬁst-stage of the
2SLS method. We report the simple partial R2 and the Shea’s (1997) partial R2 of excluded
instruments at the ﬁrst-stage. We also report the F-stat form of the Cragg-Donald’s statistic.
This statistic has been suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) for weak instrument test. The
Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, consistent to heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation, checks the validity of excluded instruments. Lastly, the countries-speciﬁc FE
allows us to overcome a possible bias of omitted variables. In fact, there are not theoretical
arguments to explain the BCS with only bilateral trade. In a context of multiple equilibri-
ums, sharing a common language, a common border and same information can coordinate
the choice of the desired equilibrium 11.
8 For example, Inklaar et al. (2005) use the Hodrick and Prescott’s (1997) ﬁlter and ﬁnd on average,
a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.68 (1970-1979 period), 0.58 (1979-1987 period), 0.45 (1987-98 period), 0.52
(1999-2003 period) for the 21 OECD countries and 0.61 (1970-1979 period), 0.68 (1979-1987 period), 0.70
(1987-1998 period), 0.65 (1999-2003 period) for the euro zone.
9 For example for the pair of countries A and B, the ﬁrst decade observation may aﬀect either (or both)
the second or the third decade observation.
10 However, we do not correct for the spatial dependencies in computing covariance matrices. The ob-
servation of the pair of countries A and B may depend on the observation of the pair of countries B and
C.
11 Moreover we do not control for the logarithm of distance between the pair of countries, a dummy
variable for common border and a dummy variable for common language since they are used as instruments
for the ﬁrst-stage of the 2SLS technique.
55 Results
5.1 Baseline estimation results
5.1.1 Results
Basic results are presented in table 2. They conﬁrm our intuition. We obtain a positive
and signiﬁcant impact of African bilateral trade intensity on African BCS. More African
bilateral trade leads to more BCS which in turn is favorable to monetary integration. The
estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level and equals to 4.45 (for TI1) and 14.43 (for
TI2) with OLS technique. Coeﬃcients magnitudes are much stronger with 2SLS technique:
6.14 for TI1 and 18.26 for TI2. Excluded instruments are all signiﬁcant at 1% for bilateral
trade intensity at the ﬁrst stage. The logarithm of distance between countries of pair aﬀects
negatively bilateral trade intensities while both the dummy variable for common border and
the dummy variable for common language increase bilateral trade intensities. The simple
partial R2 and the Shea’s (1997) partial R2 suggest that instruments explain about 20% of
the variance of bilateral trade intensities. The Hansen-Sargan’s J-statistic feebly accepts
the validity of instruments: the null hypothesis is accepted at 19% for TI1 and 12% for
TI2. The F-test of excluded instruments corroborates this ﬁnding. The Cragg-Donald’s
statistics show that baseline speciﬁcations are not aﬀected by weak-instruments problems
since tabulate values are largely greater than critical values. All of these tests comfort us
that instruments used in this paper reasonably ﬁt bilateral trade intensities. The inclusion
of countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects reduces the sizes of the impact of bilateral trade intensity on BCS:
from 6.14 to 2.14 for TI1 (which remains signiﬁcant at 10%) and from 18.26 to 7.58 for TI2
(which remains signiﬁcant at 5%).
5.1.2 Interpretation of results: the impact of the adoption of monetary union
by African pairs of countries
In order to make results economically meaningful, we compute changes of BCS which would
result from the adoption of MU by pairs of countries without MU arrangement. We suppose
that if a pair of countries forms a MU, then, on average, their bilateral trade intensity would
reach the level of bilateral trade intensity between MU’s pairs, ceteris paribus. Bilateral
trade intensities are four to six times much higher for MUs than others pairs of countries:
0.0042 (against 0.0007 for TI1) and 0.0016 (against to 0.0003 for TI2) 12. The adoption of
MU would increase bilateral trade intensity by 0.0035 for TI1 (0.0035 = 0.0042 - 0.0007)
and by 0.0013 for TI2 (0.0013 = 0.0016 - 0.0003). The signiﬁcant impact of bilateral trade
intensity on BCS goes from 2.14 to 6.14 with TI1 and from 7.58 to 18.26 with TI2. This rise
in bilateral trade intensities increases in turn the correlation coeﬃcient of countries’ GDP
business cycles from 0.0075 to 0.0215 (when using TI1) and from 0.0099 to 0.0237 (when
using TI2) 13. The synchronization level rises from 0.0403 to 0.0478 (0.0403 + 0.0075) or to
0.0618 (0.0403 + 0.0215) when using TI1 and from 0.0403 to 0.0502 (0.0403 + 0.0099) or
to 0.0640 (0.0403 + 0.0237) when using TI2. These modiﬁcations are important in terms
12 See Table 1, p. 10 for calculations.
13 0.0075 = 0.0035*2.14 and 0.0215 = 0.0035*6.14
0.0099 = 0.0013*7.58 and 0.0237 = 0.0013*18.26
6of percentage change from 18.6% to 53.3% with TI1 and from 24.6% to 58.8% with TI2. If
African countries adopt common currency, it could lead to a gain in BCS from 18.6% to
58.8%. However, because of the low level of initial BCS, changes remain small.
5.2 Robsutness checks
We apply various robustness checks to validate our estimates.
The ﬁrst robustness test is whether the impact of bilateral trade intensity on BCS is a
direct or conditioning phenomenon of MU membership (see table 3). We obtain no direct
eﬀect of MU on BCS since the associated coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that
the impact of TI1 on BCS is strengthened by MU membership while the eﬀect of TI2 is not.
Those results seem to be, at best, puzzling and not clear-cut. Our interpretation is that there
is no clear evidence of direct and conditioning eﬀects of MU membership. These ﬁndings
support the Fielding and Shields’s (2005a and 2005b) and the Baxter and Kouparitsas’s
(2005) results.
We also verify the validity of our baseline results as we control for multilateral trade and
monetary and ﬁscal policies coordination (a multivariate approach). Results are reported in
table 4. We ﬁnd that the impact of multilateral trade is negative and signiﬁcant (except when
we use countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects technique). Fiscal policies similarity is no longer signiﬁcant
eﬀect on BCS while the coordination of monetary policies increases signiﬁcantly the BCS.
Above all, our bilateral trade intensity indicators still have a positive and robust eﬀect on
BCS.
The last robustness check is about the choice of the ﬁlter. We apply the Hodrick and
Prescott’s (1997) ﬁlter (HP ﬁlter) to compute GDP business cycles. We then follow Ravn and
Uhlig (2002) by setting λ = 6.25 for annual data. We re-estimate equation (1) by changing
the BCS measure (see table 3). Correlation coeﬃcient between the HP ﬁlter measure and the
Baxter and King’s (1999) ﬁlter measure is about 0.8251 and is statistically robust at 1% (see
table 1 for a description of BCS throughout decades and across MU membership with the HP
ﬁlter). The impact of bilateral trade intensity remains positive but is only signiﬁcant with
OLS estimates while the impact of multilateral trade does not change (results not shown).
The use of HP ﬁlter reduces the robustness of our estimates but we are still conﬁdent about
the relevance of ours results using the Baxter and King’s (1999) ﬁlter which is two-side ﬁlter
(i.e. the band-pass ﬁlter identiﬁes both short and long cycles) and was built in order to
analyze business cycles synchronization (see Baxter and Kouparitsas 2005). Controlling for
the eﬀect of MU membership and multilateral trade and the use of an alternative ﬁlter do
not change much the impact of bilateral trade intensity on BCS.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper argues that the impact of African bilateral trade on BCS over the 1975-2004
period is positive and robust. We check whether this eﬀect is not driven by MU membership
speciﬁcally, by the impact of multilateral trade or by the ﬁltering technique. We have more-
over tried to provide more economic interpretation of our estimates by assuming the adoption
of MU arrangement by African countries that are not and by computing BCS changes. Fig-
7ures show important relative gains between 18.6% and 58.8% but the synchronization levels
still remain low. The impact of bilateral trade on BCS might be more important since we
only use oﬃcial IMF’s trade data which underestimate the real bilateral trade in the African
context. African informal trade is certainly much higher and a single currency reduces both
formal and informal trade transaction costs.
In addition to macroeconomic convergence criteria, the promotion of bilateral trade by
dropping tariﬀ, non-tariﬀ and infrastructures barriers would accelerate the synchronization
of African business cycles and facilitate the African monetary integration. More trade thus
brings African business cycles closer together and could add force to various projects of
monetary integration in progress. Finally, we are aware that these results do not take into
account others possible controls mentioned in recent papers such as similarity of trade and
of productive structure (see Imbs 2004, Fidrmuc 2005, Baxter and Kouparitsas 2005). Such
data are very diﬃcult to collect for African countries. However, the originality of this paper
remains the optimistic view on African monetary integration. It provides some insights on
the fact that African MUs could be self-validating through bilateral trade.
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TI1 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0012 0.0042 0.0007 0 0.0761 2310
(0.43) (0.04) (0.00)
TI2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0016 0.0003 0 0.0189 2610
(0.38) (0.01) (0.00)
Notes: MU denotes pairs of countries forming monetary union. Probabilities means-diﬀerences tests (Two-sample data t-tests on the equality of means
assuming unequal variances) are in parentheses: more probability is weak more means are diﬀerent. Means-diﬀerences tests compare two consecutive
periods. Corr. BP denotes BCS compute with the Baxter and Kouparitsas’s (2005) (2,8) ﬁlter, Corr. HP represents the Hodrick and Prescott’s (1997)
(λ = 6.25) ﬁlter,TI1 bilateral trade intensity relative to total trade and TI1 bilateral trade intensity relative to total output.
1
0Table 2: Trade intensity and Business Cycles Synchronization: Baseline estimations.
Dependent Variable: Corr. BP
OLS 2SLS FE OLS 2SLS FE
TI1 4.45*** 6.14* 2.14*
(1.45) (3.43) (1.24)
TI2 14.43*** 18.26* 7.58**
(4.00) (9.53) (3.26)
First-Stage First-Stage






F-test of excluded F(3, 871) = 12.95 F(3, 924) = 17.29
instruments p = 0.00 p = 0.00
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 0.20 0.21
Partial R2 0.20 0.21
Hansen-Sargan’s χ(2) = 3.27 χ(2) = 4.26
J-statistic p = 0.19 p = 0.12
Cragg-Donald’s stat. 169.39 207.90
Critical value 22.30 22.30
R2 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.11
Observations 2016 2016 2016 2349 2349 2349
Pairs of countries 872 872 872 925 925 925
Notes: All regressions include an intercept and decade-speciﬁc dummies (1985-1994, 1995-2004) and corrected for the
heteroskedasticity with clusters method. OLS for Ordinary Least Squares, 2SLS for Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and
FE for the countries’ speciﬁc "ﬁxed eﬀect". The partial R2 of excluded instruments how much instruments contribute in
explaining the variance of endogenous regressor at the ﬁrst-stage of the 2SLS. The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions, consistent to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, checks the validity of excluded instruments. The F-
stat form of the Cragg-Donald’s statistic is the statistic of the Stock and Yogo’s (2002) weak instrument test. The null
hypothesis is that the instruments are weak, even if parameters are identiﬁed. The test rejects the null hypothesis if
tabulate value exceeds the critical value. Critical values depend on the number of included endogenous regressors (here n
= 1), the number of instrumental variables (here K2 = 3), and the desired maximal bias of the 2SLS estimator relative to
OLS (10%). They are taken from Stock and Yogo (2002) and based on 2SLS bias, signiﬁcance level is 5% (see table 2, p.
60). Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcatif à 10; ** signiﬁcatif à 5%; *** signiﬁcatif à 1%.
11Table 3: Monetary union, trade intensity and Business Cycles Synchronization.
Dependent Variable: Corr. BP
FE









MU 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Observations 3170 2016 2349 2016 2349
Pairs of countries 1277 872 925 872 925
Notes: All regressions include an intercept and decade-speciﬁc dum-
mies (1985-1994, 1995-2004) and corrected for the heteroskedasticity
with clusters method. MU denotes a dummy variable MU taking
value 1 when pair of the countries form a monetary union. OLS for
Ordinary Least Squares, 2SLS for Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
and FE for the countries’ speciﬁc "ﬁxed eﬀect". Clustered robust
standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcatif à 10; ** signiﬁcatif à
5%; *** signiﬁcatif à 1%.
12Table 4: Trade intensity, multilateral trade, policies coordination and business cycles syn-
chronization.
Dependent Variable: Corr. BP
OLS 2SLS FE OLS 2SLS FE
TI1 3.56** 6.88** 2.05
(1.68) (3.34) (1.52)
TI2 13.95*** 18.60** 9.32**
(4.99) (9.12) (3.90)
TT -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.03 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08)
Corr. Fiscal 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Corr. Monetary 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
First stage First stage






F-Test of excluded F(3, 711) = 10.35 F(3, 718) = 16.86
instruments: p = 0.0000 p = 0.0000
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 0.24 0.28
Partial R2 0.24 0.28
Hansen-Sargan’s χ(2) = 2.17 χ(2) = 2.65
J-statistic p = 0.34 p = 0.27
Cragg-Donald Stat. 133.24 194.45
Critical value 22.30 22.30
R2 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.15
Observations 1253 1253 1253 1260 1260 1260
Pairs of countries 712 712 712 719 719 719
Notes: See Table 2, p. 11 for notes. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcatif à 10; ** signiﬁcatif
à 5%; *** signiﬁcatif à 1%.
13Table 5: Trade intensity and Business Cycles Synchronization: Hodrick and Prescott’s
(1997).
Dependent Variable: Corr. HP
OLS 2SLS FE OLS 2SLS FE
TI1 4.04** 6.15 1.19
(1.69) (3.78) (1.49)
TI2 13.86*** 15.90 4.79
(4.80) (10.92) (3.83)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.12
Observations 2190 2190 2190 2511 2511 2511
Pairs of countries 910 910 910 964 964 964
Notes: All regressions include an intercept and decade-speciﬁc dummies (1985-1994, 1995-2004) and
corrected for the heteroskedasticity with clusters method. OLS for Ordinary Least Squares, 2SLS
for Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and FE for the countries’ speciﬁc "ﬁxed eﬀect". See table 2,
p. 11 for 2SLS notes (we do not present ﬁrst-stage in this table because it is exactly the same as
table 2). Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcatif à 10; ** signiﬁcatif à 5%;
*** signiﬁcatif à 1%.
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